employing voluntary sentencing guidelines systems that nonetheless require a court to apply a suggested sentence range and provide justification for any sentence above that recommended by the range. Depending on how future court decisions define the scope of Blakely, it is also possible that two indeterminate sentencing states-Michigan and Pennsylvania-that employ presumptive sentencing guidelines systems may run afoul of the ruling. Finally, Blakely has implications for other state sentencing provisions beyond these 21 with structured sentencing systems.
5 Every statute that provides for an enhanced penalty beyond that authorized solely by the jury's verdict must be examined to determine whether it is based on facts-other than prior conviction-determined by a judge. Such statutes include those that allow additional punishment upon a judge's finding that the defendant was on parole at the time of the offense, that the crime was committed for compensation, or that the victim was of a certain age. We will discuss these implications in a companion report, Legal Considerations for State Sentencing Systems.
Although Justice O'Connor may have understated the number of states affected by the Court's ruling, the situation may not be as dire as her conclusion that " [o] ver 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost." 6 It is true that affected states will have to amend their sentencing structures in large or small ways. But that reality is tempered by the fact that in many states, unlike the federal system, judicial fact-finding is used in only a small fraction of cases and thus is easier to avoid while states are constructing responses. Moreover, there are ways to cure Blakely ills, and examples exist of constitutionally-sound solutions that largely preserve the goals that drove states to enact
Glossary
The following definitions reflect their most common usage and their usage in this report.
Structured sentencing system: a system providing some form of recommended sentences within statutory sentence ranges.
Sentencing guidelines system: procedures to guide sentencing decisions and a system of multiple, recommended sentences based generally on a calculation of the severity of the offense committed and the criminal history of the offender.
Presumptive sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that require a judge to impose the recommended (presumptive) sentence or one within a recommended range, or provide justification for imposing a different sentence.
Voluntary sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that do not require a judge to impose a recommended sentence, but may require the judge to provide justification for imposing a different sentence.
Presumptive sentencing: a system of recommended (presumptive) sentences, based solely on the offense or offense class, that a judge must impose or provide justification for imposing a different sentence.
Effective maximum sentence: the maximum sentence authorized for an offense based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
Enhanced sentence: a sentence longer than the effective maximum sentence.
Determinate sentencing system: a system in which there is no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be released from prison only after expiration of the sentence imposed (less available good or earned time).
Indeterminate sentencing system: a system in which a discretionary releasing authority, such as a parole board, may release an offender from prison prior to expiration of the sentence imposed. It may also, but need not, allow judges to impose a sentence range (such as, three-to-six years) rather than a specific period of time to be served. That having been said, states' ability to limit judicial discretion to achieve these and other goals is now significantly constrained. It is perhaps ironic that the Court has found that the Sixth Amendment, with its jury guarantee as a bulwark against state power, actually limits attempts to reign in judicial authority through structured sentencing. On the one hand, it is hard to argue with the Court's view of the centrality of both the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers and the application of the highest standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed the dissenting justices do not make much of an effort. On the other hand, it is the Court's insistence on drawing a "bright-line" formulation to protect these rights, one that establishes a firm constitutional line rather than allowing legislative and judicial flexibility, that is precipitating the present upheaval.
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The Impact of Blakely on State Systems
At the end of the day, Blakely's reach largely will be determined by courts in the states. They will determine the force and effect of their sentencing rules and whether certain provisions violate Blakely. And they will determine whether simply the offending provisions are affected or whether a state's entire structured sentencing scheme is void. It is likely that results will differ state to state based on distinctions in sentencing structures, differing interpretations of the Court's ruling, and the degree to which pragmatic concerns about systemic impact influence judgment. It will take a few years for the ultimate nature and scope of Blakely's impact to be known, but this much we know for certain: its potential to reshape sentencing in the United States is profound, as we discuss below.
Presumptive sentencing guidelines systems
It is evident that the four other states (not including Kansas, which is discussed below) with presumptive sentencing guidelines systems-Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon,
and Tennessee-will be affected by the decision to the same extent as Washington. In each of these states, guidelines establish a range for an offense that sets the maximum sentence a judge may impose based on the jury's verdict.
A judge may impose a sentence above the maximum in the range only when the judge makes a finding of aggravating factors. or "not adequately protect the public;" in such cases the judge may impose any term up to the statutory maximum.
15
In California, statutes prescribe a "lower," "middle," and "upper" term for each offense and require a judge to impose the middle term absent a finding of "aggravating circumstances." 16 In Colorado, on the other hand, statutes set a fairly wide "presumptive range" for each offense class and require the court to impose a definite sentence within the presumptive range unless it concludes that "extraordinary aggravating circumstances" are present and support a different sentence that "better serves the purposes" of the criminal code. If the judge finds such circumstances, the judge may impose a sentence up to twice the maximum authorized in the presumptive range for the offense.
17
As with the presumptive guidelines jurisdictions, these states share the common problem that a jury verdict, or guilty plea, only authorizes a sentence to the presumptive term or within the presumptive range. Any enhanced sentence relies on judicial fact-finding in violation of the Blakely rule.
Voluntary sentencing systems
In contrast with states that use presumptive sentencing systems, with or without guidelines, 10 jurisdictions employ voluntary guidelines systems. These systems are similar in structure to the Washington guidelines in that they prescribe a range of sentences for each offense or offense class, but they differ in that the ranges are expressly not binding.
Because there is considerable variety in the structure of these systems and differences in how legislatures instruct judges to employ the guidelines, some states may be at greater risk to
Blakely challenge than others. These 10 jurisdictions fall into two basic groups.
In four of these systems-those of the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin-judges are encouraged to consider guidelines ranges in determining appropriate sentences, but no additional fact-finding is required of a judge to impose a sentence outside the range and up to the statutory maximum. Nor is there a requirement that judges provide reasons for doing so. In these four jurisdictions, the effective maximum sentence-that which is authorized by the jury verdict or a defendant's guilty plea-is the statutory maximum in all cases; thus they do not seem to conflict with Blakely.
The other six voluntary guidelines states-Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia-may, however, run afoul of Blakely. They require judges first to apply the guidelines ranges but then allow them to depart upward-provided they state their reasons for doing so. In Arkansas, for example, "the presumptive sentence" in all cases is determined according to sentencing guidelines; for VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
5
STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS the judge to impose a sentence that varies more than five percent from the presumptive sentence, written justification "specifying the reasons for such departure" must be given.
18
Similarly, in Virginia the judge must "review and consider" the suitability of the applicable "discretionary" sentencing guidelines. Before imposing sentence, the judge "shall state for the record" that such review and consideration have been accomplished. If the judge imposes a sentence greater than that indicated by the guidelines, the judge must file a "written explanation of such departure."
19
The On the one hand, therefore, it may be argued that a sentence with an enhanced minimum term in Michigan and Pennsylvania effectively exceeds that authorized by the jury verdict because a defendant who receives such a sentence likely will remain incarcerated longer than one who receives a sentence with a minimum term within the guidelines range.
To the extent that an enhanced minimum term-that is, one beyond the guidelines range-leads to a longer period of incarceration by extending the date at which the defendant is eligible to be released, these systems may be held to violate Blakely.
On the other hand, it is also possible to characterize the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict as being controlled solely by the maximum term in an indeterminate system, and there is no limit on the maximum term a judge may set in these two states up to the statutory maximum.
Moreover, because of the discretion vested in the parole board-the hallmark of indeterminate sentencing-some who are given non-enhanced minimum terms may remain incarcerated longer than those sentenced to enhanced minimum terms; the minimum term only commences parole eligibility but does not require that a defendant be released on that date. Thus, to the extent it is determined that the effective maximum sentence is the statutory maximum or that the mere likelihood of an increased period of incarceration is not sufficient to trigger the jury right, these systems will be upheld. likely will turn on the goals it sought to achieve by enacting guidelines, the degree to which those goals remain vital, and the combustible political forces that exert themselves whenever criminal justice is the subject of reform.
The feasibility of jury fact-finding
After the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the state's guidelines system in 2001 (presaging Blakely), the legislature chose to retain presumptive guidelines by incorporating jury fact-finding as the basis of an enhanced sentence.
29
Kansas's choice and its subsequent experience thus provide some guidance for states that must alter their systems.
Under the revised system, if Kansas prosecutors decide to seek an enhanced sentence, they must file a motion 30 days before trial. The judge then decides whether, in the interests of justice, the evidence of enhancing factors must be presented at a post-trial sentencing hearing rather than at the trial. 30 Only evidence that has been disclosed to the defense is admissible in an enhancement determination; if the defendant testifies at such a hearing it is not admissible in any subsequent criminal proceeding. The jury must be unanimous that a factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury finds such a factor, the judge nonetheless retains the discretion to sentence within or beyond the guidelines range. Presumably they did so to achieve a proper balance between judicial discretion and legislative or administrative control so that sentences are geographically and racially neutral and appropriate to the offense. 
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The hope is that Blakely provides as much an opportunity as it does a challenge and that legislators will develop different and better approaches ... Blakely is largely unknown and will guide legislatures in crafting new systems that preserve a reinvigorated right to trial by jury while also preserving to the greatest extent possible the goals of their structured sentencing systems.
Other possible options
The hope is that Blakely provides as much an opportunity as it does a challenge and that legislators will develop different and better approaches than those we have mentioned.
To 2 This examination focuses solely on the effects of Blakely on state sentencing structures. It does not address the ruling's significant impact on the federal sentencing structure.
3 As discussed below, Kansas's system is not generally implicated by
Blakely.
4 Rhode Island does not have a guidelines system per se. Rather, it employs "sentencing benchmarks" similar to the other five states mentioned here, established by court rule.
5 In this paper we use "structured sentencing systems" to refer to sentencing guidelines, whether labeled presumptive or voluntary, as well as to other comprehensive systems of presumptive sentences.
on jury sentencing for all cases tried before a jury. In such cases, the jury is free to select any sentence within the statutory sentence range and is not in any way required to base the sentence on the sentencing guidelines. In such jury-sentencings, no Blakely issue is raised.
However, the judge determines the sentence in any case where: the defendant pleads guilty to an offense; the defendant waives a jury trial and is tried by the court; the jury does not unanimously agree on the sentence; or the prosecution and the defense agree that the court may fix punishment. In such cases, the court must apply the sentencing guidelines and provide justification for an enhanced sentence.
20 Louisiana provides an example of a state whose guidelines were labeled as voluntary but found by the courts to be presumptive because judges were required to apply them and provide reasons for departing from the recommended range. at 11 (Corrigan, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27 One other state, New Jersey, has a provision adjunct to its basic presumptive sentencing structure whereby judges may, upon the judicial finding of aggravating factors, set a minimum term that increases the likelihood that a defendant will remain incarcerated longer than otherwise. New Jersey uses an indeterminate system in which judges set a maximum term for each sentence; the minimum term for each sentence is one-third of the maximum imposed by the court. Yet, upon the finding that "aggravating factors substantially outweigh the miti- Unattributed points of view are those of the authors and do not represent the position or policies of the JEHT Foundation. We offer our thanks to Nomi Maeyama of the Vera Institute and to interns David Gopstein of Princeton University and Katherin Slimak of Tulane Law School for their tenacious efforts to keep abreast of the many Blakely twists and turns in the weeks after the decision.
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